Search for: "Person v. Person" Results 3741 - 3760 of 123,220
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6 Apr 2018, 8:03 am
The Court of Appeal heard arguments regarding whether, if they had accepted Kymab's construction of "in situ replacement", they could nevertheless have found infringement on the basis of Actavis v Eli Lilly (Eli Lilly v Actavis UK [2017] UKSC 48, IPKat post). [read post]
18 Oct 2007, 2:05 am
Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd and another; Topping v Bench Town Ltd (formerly Jones Bros Preston Ltd); Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd; Grieves v F T Everard & Sons Ltd and another [2007] UKHL 39 “A person who developed pleural plaques as a result of having been negligently exposed to asbestos in the course of his employment, could not sue his employers for negligence because the presence of pleural plaques did… [read post]
28 Jun 2010, 2:25 am by traceydennis
Regina v Lee [2010] EWCA Crim 1404; [2010] WLR (D) 160 “The offence under s 85(5)(b) of the Medicines Act 1968 of selling or supplying a medicinal product which was misleadingly labelled or marked in respect of the nature or quality of the product, where such sale or supply was done by a person ‘in the course of a business carried on by him’, could not be committed by a person who was merely employed or engaged by the business which carried out the sale… [read post]
24 May 2016, 11:10 am by Bob Farb
Beheler, 511 U.S. 318 (1994), and other cases that a person is in custody under the Miranda rule when officers have formally arrested the person—for any offense, whether a felony or misdemeanor—or have restrained a person’s movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest (for example, handcuffing plus other circumstances; see State v. [read post]
24 May 2016, 11:10 am by Bob Farb
Beheler, 511 U.S. 318 (1994), and other cases that a person is in custody under the Miranda rule when officers have formally arrested the person—for any offense, whether a felony or misdemeanor—or have restrained a person’s movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest (for example, handcuffing plus other circumstances; see State v. [read post]
28 May 2011, 9:21 am by Amy Burns
§ 1512(a)(1)(C), makes it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to. . . prevent the communication by any person to a [Federal] law enforcement officer” of “information relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense. [read post]